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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Background and Research Motivation  
Since the Ideal-X was modified to be the first container ship in 1956, container liner 
shipping has developed rapidly in the ensuing 60 years. Endured both golden times 
and periodical recessions over long history, the industry has been experiencing 
dramatic shuffling especially in past two years. Two new alliances 2M and O3 (see 
description in Appendix V) formed in 2014 among five top container carriers operating 
jointly in the six East-West routes (Appendix V). The average number of operators and 
slot charterers per service has increased significantly in most East-West routes, driven 
partly by cooperation in and across alliances. 
 
2015 witnessed an unstable container liner freight market. Shanghai Containerized 
Freight Index (SCFI) [1] reported largest week-on-week loss record in November 2015 
since the index was launched in 2009 – spot rates on Asia North Europe route 
plummeted by 31.8%. In the meanwhile, a flurry of industry news was released in 
November with most of it paint a very bleak picture for the rest of 2015. Besides freight 
fluctuation, 2015 also saw merger and acquisition talks. At the time of writing, the 
French CMA-CGM has exclusively acquired Singapore-based NOL[2].  
 
Three common concerns exist in contemporary container liner shipping industry. First, 
whether container liner market is competitive or not; second, what are the competitive 
conditions in container liner market; third, how the container liner industry contributes 
to economic growth. The dissertation consists of three studies to address 
aforementioned concerns respectively.  
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1.2 Layout of Thesis  
The dissertation consists of five chapters. With this chapter serves as an introduction, 
chapter 2, 3, 4 each focuses on one topic of the competitive conditions in container 
liner shipping industry. Finally, chapter 5 draws the conclusions.  
 
Chapter 2 examines contestability in contemporary container liner market. Liner 
freight has been fluctuating dramatically in last two decades. It is of the entire 
industry’s interest to understand the causes of freight rate fluctuation as well as how 
liner carriers should operate to stay profitable. Alliance is one of the forms carriers 
have taken to cooperate for mutual benefit. The first alliance was formed between 
Maersk and Sea-land in 1990s. Alliance has been prevailing in container liner market 
since conference regime abolishment in 2008. Merger and reformation of alliances 
have taken place frequently in recent years. The industry is full of large alliances now. 
Applying to industry statistics, the chapter aims to identify if the container liner market 
in alliance era is competitive.  
 
Contestable market theory proposed by Baumol (1982) is applied to test the 
competiveness. A market is perfectly contestable if entry is absolutely free and exit is 
costless. In a world of alliances, entry to liner market nowadays does not refer to new 
companies appearing, but rather to existing ones expanding their networks with new 
services (new markets). In the form of alliance, a carrier can enter or leave rapidly any 
market without losing their capital; entry and exit barrier to the market is low. The 
features match the conditions of contestable market. 
 
This chapter first investigates market concentration level measured by Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI). HHI is a commonly accepted measure of market 
concentration level. The lower the market's concentration level, the closer the market 
is to being competitive. If HHI has no or less impact on liner freight rates, one can 
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conclude that the contestable market feature-matching container liner market is 
competitive.  
 
The model is derived from supply and demand functions. The empirical results 
estimated with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Box-Cox methods show the 
coefficient of HHI on liner freight rate is -0.009 and it is statistically insignificant even 
at 10% significant level. The null hypothesis that the effect of HHI on liner freight 
rates is zero cannot be rejected. Higher concentration level does not lead to higher liner 
freight rate.   
 
Coefficient of alliance member’s share on liner freight rate is statistically significant 
at 1% level in both models. Higher alliance share leads to higher freight rate. This 
maybe explained that alliance allows member lines to adjust short-term capacity 
supply relevantly easier, higher alliance share enables better efficiency to adjust supply 
and demand imbalance to reach a new equilibrium point. In reality, it suggests that 
carriers need to cooperate to achieve efficiency especially in declining market situation.  
 
This study also finds that static equilibrium does not exist in contemporary liner market. 
Equilibrium is established when price (freight rate) is approximately equal to marginal 
cost (MC). Since formation of alliance allows member lines to have a lower marginal 
cost, those member lines are profitable. With new entrants joined, supply curve 
becomes more flat, new equilibrium establishes at lower price level. When price is too 
low for most carriers to be break even, some carriers opt to reduce capacity or 
withdrawn from certain routes (markets), slop of supply curve comes deeper, which 
shifts the equilibrium point upwards. Some carriers become profitable again. However, 
the situation will not last long - equilibrium point shifts again with the movements of 
industry average cost triggered by technology advance or reforming of alliance. 
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In conclusion, the empirical results in this chapter suggest contemporary container 
liner market is contestable. Higher concentration level leads to lower freight rate. To 
survive in a declining market, carriers have no choice but to cooperate for agile 
response to supply and demand changes. Alliance does not hamper competition but is 
rather a way to sustain container liner shipping industry. It also suggests that regulators 
should be more lenient in evaluating carrier’s alliance filing requests. 
 
The objective of chapter 3 is to examine the competitive conduct in container liner 
shipping market. This chapter tackles on the competitive conditions of liner market 
measured with H-statistic developed by Panzar and Rosse (P-R Test). Panzar and 
Rosse (1977, 1987) developed H-statistic to measure the competitive structure of an 
industry. H-statistic is estimated as the sum of the elasticities of the reduced form 
(equilibrium) revenues with respect to input prices. It is interpreted as that if H ≤ 0 the 
market is monopoly. With perfect competition, H = 1. When 0 < H < 1, the market is 
in monopolistic competition. A higher H-statistic is often interpreted as an indicator of 
higher degree of competitiveness. 
 
Two relevant studies are conducted to container liner shipping industry. Endo (2005) 
estimated H statistic for top three Japanese carriers (NYK Line, MOL, K-Line) during 
1986 – 2002 is 0.54, which indicated the top three Japanese container carriers operated 
in monopolistic competitive condition. Sys et al. (2011) investigated the competitive 
conditions in container liner market for the period 1999 to 2008 (the period before the 
abolishment of the conference in 2008) for a sample of 18 container liner carriers, and 
found the H-statistic during that period varies from 0.68 to 0.87. 
 
This chapter follows Shaffer’s (1982, 1983) demonstration of P-R test for the 
relationship of competitive conduct and demand elasticity, or H = E+1, where E is the 
demand elasticity across the entire market or industry. The demand elasticties are 
obtained using Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ADL) model in order to separate short-
run and long-run effects. The demand elasticities are estimated basis on container liner 
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industry statistics for the period of 2009 to 2014 in the six East-West routes. The H-
statistic calculated basis on estimated demand elasticities ranges from 0.72 to 0.79.  
The result is consistent with the findings in previous research that container liner 
shipping industry can be described as displaying monopolistic competitive behaviour.  
 
Chapter 4 estimates the effects of container liner industry on economic growth from 
macroeconomic angle. Container liner shipping and the influence it has had on global 
trade have been significantly important over the past 50 years. Declining transport 
costs have allowed low value cargo to be traded, and cargo from remote areas to be 
sold in new markets. Trade growth in East Asia, notably in China, has clearly 
contributed to their container shipping industries. However, few studies have 
quantified such positive effects, and its implications to carriers and regulators in other 
regions.  
 
The model is derived from the macroeconomic identity: Y=C+I+G+NX where GDP 
(Y) is the sum of Consumption (C), Investment (I), Government Purchase (G) and Net 
Exports (NX). Since Export and Import are composed of commodity value and 
transport costs, Net Exports can be expressed as net results of commodity value and 
transport costs. Given the fact that more than 75% of international transport are 
containerised (Notteboom and Rodrigue 2008), the relationship between GDP (Y) and 
container liner freight rate (fr) can be estimated applying to statistical methods.  
 
This study applies panel data for 31 countries over seven years. In addition to liner 
freight rate, liner connectivity index is introduced into the model to better assess the 
effects of liner shipping industry have had in economic growth. The model is estimated 
with both fixed effects (using Ordinary Least Squares) and random effects (using 
Feasible Generalised Least Squares) to accommodate missing periods and unobserved 
effects. The results suggest the coefficient of liner freight rate is statistically significant 
at the 5% level, ceteris paribus one point increase in liner freight rate increases GDP 
growth by approximately 0.0014 points.  The positive relationship of liner freight rate 
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and GDP growth differs from the conclusions drawn in previous research for different 
period. Reducing transport costs do not contribute to trade growth nowadays.  
 
Chapter 5 concludes the dissertation. It summarises the methods applied and major 
outcomes, followed by description of originality and impacts of study, as well as the 
limitations of study. The chapter ends with prospect of future research topics.  
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Chapter 2 Container Liner Shipping Market Contestability 
This chapter tests container liner market contestability in alliance era applying panel 
data for a sample of six East-West container liner shipping routes. The empirical model 
derived from supply and demand function estimates the effects that concentration 
measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), alliance share and fuel prices have 
on liner freight rates. The null hypothesis that the impact of market concentration level 
on container liner freight rates is zero cannot be rejected even at 10% level of 
significance. Coefficient of HHI may be zero. The estimated HHI coefficient is 
extremely small and has negative value of -0.009, which implies market concentration 
level has little impact on container liner freight rates. Container liner market is hence 
considered as highly contestable. The empirical results also suggest that alliance plays 
a role to stabilize container liner shipping market.  
  
2.1 Introduction 
Shipping conference and alliance are two main forms of liner shipping organisation. 
Shipping conference concentrated mainly on routes to and from Europe, peaked in 
1995-1996 (Haralambides 2004) and was abolished as from 18 October 2008 (EEC 
Regulation no. 4056/86) [3]. First shipping alliance was formed between Maersk and 
Sea-Land in Trans-Pacific and Trans-Atlantic routes in 1990s. Table 2.1 outlines key 
events in conference and alliance history in chronological order.   
 
Shipping conference refers to association formed by shipping companies to agree on 
and set freight rates over different shipping routes. There are different shipping 
conferences for different regions of the world. Conference is commonly considered as 
a cartel-like route based coalition of carriers, have price setting as objective. In the 
UNCTAD Code of Conduct for Liner Conferences (UNCTAD, 1974), the term 
conference or liner conference is defined as ‘...a group of two or more vessel operating 
carriers which provides international liner services for the carriage of cargo on a 
particular route or routes within specified geographical limits and which has an 
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agreement or arrangement, whatever its nature, within the framework of which they 
operate under uniform or common freight rates and any other agreed conditions with 
respect to the provision of liner services’. 
 
Table 2.1. A chronological table of shipping conference and alliance 
Year Milestones Source 
1830s Earliest shipping conferences activities were evidenced 
in 1830s in British coastal shipping 
Armstrong (1991) 
1875 The first modern liner conference, the U.K. - Calcutta 
conference,  was founded  
Aldcroft (1968) 
1879 The Far East Conference (later renamed to the Far East 
Freight Conference) was founded 
Federal Maritime 
Commission(2012) 
1974 UNCTAD Convention on code of Conduct for Liner 
Conferences took effect 
UNCTAD[4] 
1990s Maersk and Sea-Land introduced alliance system and 
began sharing vessels in the Atlantic and Pacific oceans 
Slack et al. (2002) 
1994 The Global Alliance formed (APL, MOL, OOCL, 
Nedlloyd) 
Stopford (2009) 
1995 Grand Alliance formed (Hapag Lloyd, NYK, NOL, 
P&O) 
Stopford (2009) 
1995 Maersk and Sea-land  Stopford (2009) 
1998 New World Alliance formed (APL, MOL, Hyundai 
Merchant Marine) 
PR News[5] 
2000 CKYH Alliance formed (Cosco, K-line, Yangming, 
Hanjin) 
Lu et al. (2006) 
2008 FEFC abolished EEC Regulation[3] 
2011 G6 Alliance formed (APL, MOL, Hyundai, Hapag 
Lloyd, NYK, OOCL) 
Websites[6] 
2014 2M Alliance formed (Maersk, MSC) Websites[7] 
2014 Ocean 3 Alliance formed (CSG, CMA-CGM, UASC) Websites[8] 
2014 CKYHE Alliance formed with Evergreen joined  Websites[9] 
 
Haralambides (2000) uses a simplified case to illustrate formation of liner conference. 
A customer comes with a container of cargo to ship while the ship is not yet full, its 
operator would be tempted to take the cargo, even at the price of as low as marginal 
cargo handling costs involved in loading the container on board. If this were common 
practice for all operators, competition amongst them would push the price down to the 
level of short-run marginal costs. Consequently, liner industry would not be 
sustainable in long-run, since operators would not be able to cover voyage costs and 
capital costs (Pirrong 1992). To keep liner industry reliable and sustainable, price 
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competition should be limited and a mechanism needs to be established to allow 
carriers to recover long-run average total costs. The mechanism was found to be 
shipping conference. 
 
Comparing to liner conferences, ‘shipping alliances are also coalitions of carriers, but 
contrarily to the route-based character and price-setting objectives of conferences.’ 
Alliances are not involved in price-setting and one of their main objectives is to offer 
shippers greater geographical coverage ‘through cooperation and dovetailing of their 
members’ operations’ (Haralambides and Veenstra 2000). Alliance allows members to 
use capacity more efficiently and better control capacity supply.  
 
Over last two decades, numbers of member lines in each alliance have increasing trend 
(Figure 2.1). Each alliance expanded global network coverage and fleet scale. In 2014, 
the 16 carriers in the four large alliances (CKYHE/2M/O3/G6) control 95 percent of 
cargo volumes moving in the major East-West routes. [10] 
       
Figure 2.1. Alliances in 1995, 2001 and 2014  
Source: Alphaliner[11]
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Unlike conference has price-setting objective, alliance allows member lines to use 
capacity more efficiently and to better control capacity supply. Alliances members 
have the flexibility of suspending certain sailings or port calls to adjust supply, so that 
one can still provide the advertised schedule without having to cater for low paying 
cargo to fill the vessel. Due to these features, large alliances are perceived as anti-
competition. A recent example is that in 2014 China blocked on the proposed P3 
alliance of Maersk, MSC and CMA CGM after deeming it anti-competitive. The 
interest of this chapter is to investigate whether the market structure of container liner 
industry in alliance era is competitive or not, which will be tested in following sections 
applying to contestable theory.   
 
Contestable market refers to a market in which there are only a few companies that, 
because of the threat of new entrants, behave in a competitive manner. A market is 
deemed to be contestable if entry and exit are relatively easy. A market is perfectly 
contestable if entry is absolutely free and exit is costless (Baumol 1982).   
 
In a world of alliances, entry to liner market nowadays does not refer to new companies 
appearing, but rather to existing ones expanding their networks with new services as 
new markets. In the form of alliance, a carrier can enter or leave rapidly any market 
without losing their capital and competitors have the same cost function as incumbent. 
In other word, entry and exist barrier to the market is low. These characters match the 
conditions of contestable market.  
 
This chapter examines the impact of market concentration level measured by HHI on 
liner freight rate to evaluate the contestability in contemporary liner shipping market. 
If a market is proved to be contestable, one can conclude the market achieves similar 
efficiency as a competitive market does. 
 
This chapter is divided into five sections. Section 2.2 reviews previous research on 
liner organizations and liner market contestability. Section 2.3 derives empirical model 
to test contestability in liner market. Section 2.4 describes the data available for 
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estimation, Section 2.5 presents the results, and conclusions are drawn in the final 
section of this chapter.   
 
2.2 Literature Review and Market Concentration Level  
2.2.1 Previous Research 
Since Maersk and Sea-Land introduced alliance system and began sharing vessels in 
the Atlantic and Pacific oceans in 1990s, strategic alliances have become increasingly 
common. Two facts are considered as the driving forces of global alliance formation. 
Firstly, fast-paced changes in globalization of world economy since the beginning of 
the 1990s permanently alter the shape of liner shipping industry. Shipping companies 
have no choice but to follow their customers on a global scale and to provide viable 
solutions to their extended requirements. Secondly, protracted unsatisfactory financial 
performance of liner shipping industry pushed liner companies towards new forms of 
co-operation. The demands for the massive investments required by the globalization 
of routes are unfortunately not met by profitability level. On the contrary, container 
freight rates on every major route have dropped faster than the gains in productivity 
(Fossey 1997). In 2007, out of 17 top liner companies that published financial results, 
only two companies (K-Line and Hapag Lloyd) reported profit while all of the rest 
were in loss [12]. This accelerated reformation of alliance to be in larger scale. 
 
On alliance formation, Yoshida et al. (2004) analyse network economy effects of 
strategic alliance and conclude that Japanese shipping lines have achieved cost 
reduction through network extension in form of alliance. Lu et al. (2006) study CKYH 
alliance member lines applying Delphi method. Their results show the top five reasons 
of forming alliances are: (a) extend service coverage, (b) provide more frequent sailing 
services, (c) faster entry to new routes, (d) share the risks of providing new liner 
services and (e) maximize operational synergy. Huang and Yoshida (2013) discuss 
contribution of alliance and empirically prove alliance formation of alliance improves 
service quality and reduces operation cost.  
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Yamagishi (2014) reviews development of international shipping industry in last 70 
years and suggests that liner carriers form alliance in meeting shipper’s changing needs 
for faster transit time, on-time delivery and service frequency. Alliance plays an 
important role to survive liner industry since the beginning of 21st century, it is 
however not a ready-made panacea to all problems. Future of alliance depends on 
economic environment. 
 
On liner market contestability, Davies (1986) argues that entrants and incumbents have 
the same access to technology; sunk costs are very low as ships can be easily diverted 
from one route to another; liners face competitions from tramp and bulk carriers. With 
these arguments, Davies concludes liner market ‘closely matches the requirements of 
extreme, ideal, perfectly contestable market.’   
 
Franck and Bunel (1991) discuss there are two kinds of entries in container liner 
market - occasional entry and entry of long time stay, exist are not subjected to same 
condition. Entry and exit barriers for outsiders expecting long time stay is high, since 
they need to divert customers from incumbents while staying profitable. The 
characteristics of demand observed in liner shipping differ from those in airline 
industry where sunk costs are limited and it is easier for entrants to obtain new 
customers by cutting prices.  The authors as such suggest liner shipping market is 
imperfectly contestable facing competition from large size outsiders. 
 
Miyashita (1976, 1988, 2002 and 2009) conducts various studies in a broad spectrum 
of transportation sectors including shipping, airfreight and integrated logistics. The 
author (Miyashita 2002 p.209) analyses the East-West routes quarterly data during 
1993 to 1996 and concludes that HHI has increasing effect on freight rate at 1% 
significance level in Asia Europe and Trans-Atlantic routes and at 20% level in Trans 
Pacific route. The author suggests market was contestable in Trans-Pacific route 
however oligopolistic in Asia Europe and Trans-Atlantic routes during that period. 
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Research on liner market contestability in alliance era has been scarce. Especially, 
none of previous research on quantification of container liner market contestability in 
alliance era has been observed.  
 
2.2.2 Liner Market Concentration Level 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) is adopted to test concentration level in container 
liner market. HHI is a commonly accepted measure of market concentration. The 
higher the HHI value, the more concentrated the industry and the greater the potential 
for market power. HHI is calculated by squaring the market share of each firm 
competing in a market, and then summing the resulting numbers.  
 
The formula of HHI calculation is given as, 
 
𝐻𝐻𝐼 =  ∑ 𝑆𝑖2𝑛𝑖=1        (2.1) 
 
where Si is market share of firm i in market. Percent as whole number is used for 
calculation in this chapter.  
 
As per guidelines of U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission 
[13], markets are generally classified into three types: unconcentrated markets when 
HHI is below 1500 and highly concentrated markets when HHI is above 2500, else 
markets are moderately concentrated. 
 
To obtain an overview on concentration level in container liner shipping market Liner 
market, concentration levels of the six East-West routes [Appendix V] during 2008 to 
2011 are plotted (Figure 2.2). Taking consideration abolishment of FEFC in October 
2008, the chart illustrates market concentration situation in post-conference era.  
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Except a few spots in Trans-Atlantic routes, HHI from 2009 onwards have all time 
been under 1500. It indicates liner market post conference era is considered as 
unconcentrated when evaluating on single carrier level.  
 
Figure 2.2. HHI in East-West routes 2008 - 2011  
Source: PIERS [14] and CTS [15]  
 
 
Same analysis is conducted using market share on alliance basis. The market share is 
basis on alliance structure in 2014 (Figure 2.3).  
 
Figure 2.3. HHI in East-West routes 2014 
Source: Alphaliner[11] 
 
 
All East-West routes are close to or higher than 2,500, which implies liner market is 
highly concentrated when evaluating on alliance basis. Existence of alliance does turn 
the market to be more concentrated.  
Alliance based HHI
2014 Asia Europe Trans Pacific Trans Atlantic
HHI 2,494              2,556                3,240               
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2.2.3 Freight Rate Stability 
Data used for analysis in this section are sourced from Drewry[16] and CTS for the 
period of 1996 – 2014[17] in the six East-West routes. To make data comparable, 
quarterly variation in percentage is applied to plot the movement (Figure 2.4).  
 
Figure 2.4. Freight rate stability in 1996 - 2014 
Source: Drewry and CTS 
 
 
There are two intuitive conclusions from the chart. First, liners freight rates are more 
stable during 1996 – 2007 (conference era), and fluctuate in bigger range during 2009 
– 2014 (post conference). Second, fluctuation from 2012 onwards becomes 
convergent. Noticing the fact that the first large alliance G6 formed in end 2011, large 
alliances seem to contribute to market stabilization. Overall freight rate fluctuation is 
relevantly small when larger alliances are present.  
 
2.3 Empirical Model 
The model applied in this study is derived from supply function.  
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The supply function is defined as, 
 
Q = a1 + b1P + c1AS + u1                    (2.2) 
 
The demand function is defined as, 
 
𝑄 = 𝑎2 + 𝑏2P + 𝑐2Fuel + 𝑢2         (2.3) 
 
Where Q is quantity, P is price (freight rate), AS is the share of alliance member 
lines, and Fuel is the fuel cost. 
 
Solve (2.1) and (2.2) to get the reduced-form equations, 
 
𝑃 = 𝜋1 + 𝜋2𝐴𝑆 + 𝜋3Fuel + 𝜐1          (2.3) 
 
𝑄 = 𝜋4 + 𝜋5𝐴S + 𝜋6Fuel + 𝜐2               (2.4) 
  
Introduce HHI (HHI), seasonality (Seas) and route control variables (Route), the 
model for estimation is given by, 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑡  = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛿𝑖
5
𝑖=1 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝜕𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑠 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                  
         (2.5) 
For i=1, …, 5 and t=1,…,35, 𝜀𝑖𝑗 𝑖s the error term. 
 
If container liner market in alliance era is contestable, market concentration level has 
no impact to liner freight rate, coefficient of HHI should be close to zero and 
statistically insignificant.  
 
To increase robustness, model is power transformed using Box-Cox model. Both 
dependent and the set of independent variables are transformed in same way.  
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The transformed Box-Cox model has the following form, 
 
𝑃𝑖𝑡
  = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝐴𝑆𝑖𝑡
𝜆 + 𝛼2𝐹𝑢𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑡
𝜆 + 𝛼3𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑖𝑡
𝜆 + ∑ 𝜏𝑖
5
𝑖=1 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑖 + 𝛾𝑆𝑒𝑎𝑠 +
𝜈𝑖𝑡                     (2.6) 
 
2.4 Data and Variables   
The data available for estimation are for a cross section panel of six East-West routes 
monthly data for the period of 2009 to 2011 (Table 2.2).  
Table 2.2. Varaibles and data sources 
Variable Description Source 
P Price indices CTS [18] 
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, calculated 
basis on actual volumes each liner operator 
carried  
PIERS[14] & 
CTS [16] 
AS Share of capacity supplied by alliance 
member lines 
ComPair data 
Fuel Average bunker price of 
380Cst/180Cst/MDO 
Bunker World 
𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑒𝑖 
(i=1, …,6) 
Route dummy for the six East and West 
routes 
- 
Seas Seasonality control, factored by Christmas 
and Chinese New Year 
- 
 
2.4.1  Price (P)   
CTS APIs (Aggregated Price Indices)[18] are applied. CTS APIs are weighted average 
of the sea freight rates including all surcharges and ancillary charges except inland 
haulage charges. It has 2008 price index value as 100. 
 
2.4.2  HHI   
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index, calculated by squaring the market share of each carrier, 
then summing the resulting numbers. Market shares are calculated basis on actual 
volumes each liner operator carried, sourced from PIERS for Trans-Pacific and Trans-
Atlantic routes and CTS for Asia Europe Routes. 
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2.4.3  Alliance share (AS) 
Percentage share of capacity provided by alliance member lines in each route. Capacity 
supply is Compair Data's estimate of TEU capacity that carriers assign to the trade 
route on a route. ComPair Data runs an algorithm to estimate what percentage of a 
service’s capacity is allocated to a route. 
 
2.4.4  Fuel  
This variable represents bunker price. There are various types of fuel oils used in vessel 
operation. All types of fuel oils are referred as bunker. Average bunker prices of three 
major types of fuel oils (380Cst, 180Cst and MDO) are applied in the estimation. 
 
2.4.5  Control variables (Routei, seas) 
The six East-West routes (Routei) and seasonality (seas) are controlled to test the 
effects on freight rate.  
 
The panel data have 210 observations for estimation (Table 2.3).  
 
Table 2.3. Descriptive statistics of the regression variables 
Name Mean St. Dev Minimum Maximum 
Q 317.740 240.940 80.928 1122.700 
P 86.796 16.279 42.000 121.000 
HHI 1143.100 348.580 589.640 1563.900 
AS 0.381 0.116 0.141 0.602 
Fuel 566.870 147.320 286.670 800.000 
 
2.5 Results  
Table 2.4 reports the results estimated by OLS and BOX-COX models respectively. 
Out of total nine variables, eight variables in OLS model and seven variables in Box-
Cox model are statistically significant at 1% or 5% level, which indicates the models 
are highly relevant.  
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Table 2.4. Estimate results (Dependent variable: p) 
Variable OLS 
BOX-COX 
(=1.11) 
HHI -0.005 
(0.012) 
                 -0.009 
    (0.021) 
 
AS     164.480*** 
(14.770) 
           267.430*** 
           (20.970) 
Fuel -0.011 
(0.007) 
-0.018* 
(0.010) 
Seas -2.152 
(1.889) 
-3.652 
(3.011) 
R1(AEW)     10.345*** 
(2.934) 
17.297*** 
(4.243) 
R2 (AEE)    10.121*** 
(2.115) 
16.622*** 
(4.275) 
R3 (TPE) -25.734** 
(10.10) 
-42.238** 
(16.960) 
R4 (TPW) -19.663** 
(9.327) 
-32.269* 
(16.550) 
R5 (TAE)   17.246*** 
(1.759) 
 28.311*** 
(4.160) 
Constant 38.360** 
(17.120) 
 49.568* 
(29.150) 
R-squared adj. 
 
0.567   0.563 
Observations 210   210 
(***denotes significance at the 1% level against two sided alternative. The estimated coefficients 
without a* are not statistically significant at a level lower than 10%. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
AEW/E=Asia Europe West/East Bound; TPE/W=Trans-Pacific East/West Bound; TAE=Trans-
Atlantic East Bound.) 
 
Adjusted R-squared in both models is relevantly lower, as some of variance has been 
explained by inclusion of seasonality and model transformation. Since all dependent 
variables are stationarised series, an R-squared of great than 25% is often considered 
good fit. Taking into account of all these factors, 56% level of adjusted R-squared 
indicates the empirical model is well explained.   
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As results reveal, null hypothesis that zero coefficient of HHI is zero cannot be rejected 
even at 10% of significant level. The impact of HHI on Price (liner freight rate) may 
be zero. Price (liner freight rate) has diminishing relationship with volume and 
increasing relationship with bunker price. One point change of HHI results price (liner 
freight rate) to move downward by 0.009 points; one point of change in bunker price 
results price (liner freight rate) to increase 0.018 points. 
 
The coefficients of route dummies have both positive and negative value, which 
implies that liner market in the six East-West routes is of different nature. The 
conclusion comply with real business practices that the competition situation in the 
westbound markets are generally different from that in the eastbound markets.  
 
Interestingly seasonality dummy coefficient has negative value, which indicates liner 
freight rate in peak season is lower than non-peak season. Shippers, when have large 
volume of cargo to ship, tend to have more bargaining power in freight rate discussion. 
One would not expect this kind of activity in oligopolistic market.  
 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter uses panel data on six East-West routes in container liner shipping to 
estimate the responsiveness of freight rate to the change of market concentration level, 
demand and bunker price. The estimation procedures accommodate heteroskedasticity 
and endogeneity.  
 
The results indicate formation of large alliances does cause market to be more 
concentrated, however the impact of market concentration level on freight rate is 
statistically insignificant. Market concentration level has weak diminishing 
relationship with liner freight rate. Since alliance member lines offer homogenous 
products, carriers compete to gain market share, as a result, price (liner freight rate) 
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goes down. Formation of alliances makes it easy for liner operators to entry into and 
exit from a competitive market, liner market in alliance era is highly contestable. 
 
Fusillo (2013) studies market share stability to characterize whether oligopolistic 
suppliers operate as a cartel. The author suggest carriers are forced to behave more 
competitively in post conference era. Higher level of concentration does not 
necessarily lead to reduced competition. This study empirically proves Fusillo’s 
conclusion. 
 
This study also finds static equilibrium does not exist. Equilibrium is established when 
price (freight rate) is approximately equal to marginal cost (MC). Since formation of 
alliance allows member lines to have a lower marginal cost, those member lines are 
profitable. However, with new entrants joined, supply curve becomes more flat, new 
equilibrium is established at lower price level. When price is too low for most carriers 
to be break even, some carriers opt to reduce capacity or withdrawn from certain routes 
(markets), slop of supply curve comes deeper, which shifts the equilibrium point 
upwards. Some carriers become profitable again. Nonetheless, the situation will not 
last long - equilibrium point shifts again with the movements of industry average cost 
triggered by technology advance or reforming of alliance.  
 
Advent of large alliances brings constant increase in vessel size, which leads to 
constant lowering of unit costs. However large alliance cannot bring the rates up, in 
the long term rates tempt to decline. In conclusion, alliance does not hamper 
competition, but is rather a solution to lower unit operational cost hence to sustain the 
industry.  
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Chapter 3 Demand Elasticity and Competitive Conduct in 
Container Liner Shipping Market 
 
This chapter follows Shaffer’s (1982, 1983) demonstration of P-R test for the 
relationship of competitive conduct and demand elasticity, or H = E+1, where H is H 
statistic of P-R test and E is the demand elasticity across the entire market or industry. 
The H-statistic for container liner shipping industry calculated basis on estimated 
demand elasticity ranges from 0.72 to 0.79. The empirical result suggests that 
container Liner Shipping industry can be described as displaying monopolistic 
competitive behaviour, and is consistent with results of literatures using different 
methods.  
 
3.1 Introduction 
Methods to assess competitive conditions can be divided into two main streams: 
structural and non-structural approaches (Bikker 2004). Structural methods are based 
on the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) paradigm of Mason (1939) and Bain 
(1951), which predicts that more concentrated markets are more collusive. In structural 
models, competition is proxied by measures of concentration, such as the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index. Non-structural methods are derived from profit maximizing 
equilibrium conditions. The two well-known non-structural models are the Panzar-
Rosse (P-R) test and the Bresnahan-Lau method. This study applies the implications 
of P-R test. 
 
Panzar and Rosse (1987) developed H-statistic to measure the competitive structure of 
an industry. H-statistic is estimated as the sum of the elasticities of the reduced form 
(equilibrium) revenues with respect to input prices. It is interpreted as that if H ≤ 0 
then the market is monopoly. With perfect competition, H = 1. When 0 < H < 1, the 
market is in monopolistic competition.  
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P-R model offers an advantage that it is easy to estimate with few independent 
variables. However it is challenging to gather enough data to perform P-R test for 
container liner industry. The alternative way of obtaining P-R H statistic is proposed 
by Shaffer (1982, 1983). Shaffer demonstrates the relationship of competitive conduct 
and demand elasticity. This chapter will follow Shaffer’s demonstration to obtain P-R 
H statistics for container liner industry. 
 
The structure of the article is as follows. Section 3.2 provides an overview of 
theoretical methodology, which is devoted largely to the alternative way of obtaining 
P-R H statistic. Section 3.3 discusses statistical methodology to obtain short-run and 
long-run demand elasticities. Section 3.4 describes the data, Section 3.5 presents the 
estimate results, and Section 3.6 contains a summary.  
 
3.2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework   
The P-R test has been applied in many industries to assess competitive conduct, often 
in specifications of controlling for firm scale or using a price equation. The approach 
developed by Rosse – Panzar  (1977) and  Panzar – Rosse (1982, 1987) is based  on 
the estimation of the reduced form revenue equation of the market participants R (z, r, 
w), with z denoting exogenous variables shifting the firm's revenue function, r 
denoting exogenous variables shifting the firm's cost function and w representing 
factor prices. The reduced form equation is derived from marginal revenue and cost 
functions and the zero profit constraint in equilibrium. The gist of this approach is the 
estimation of the elasticities of total revenues of the individual firm with respect to the 
firm's input prices. P-R H statistics is the sum of the partial elasticisties.  
 
The P-R model (Rosse and Panzar 1977) is defined as, 
 
H = w𝑅𝑤/𝑅 = 𝑅𝑞
2/Π𝑞𝑞𝑅      (3.1) 
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where subscripts denote partial derivatives.  
     
For certain specific models, Rosse and Panzar (1987) show: 
 
- Monopoly Rent Hypothesis: Under monopoly, H is non-positive. 
- Market Equilibrium:  If firms maximize profits and there are market forces (entry) 
that drive profits to zero, H ≤ 1. 
- Competition Hypothesis: For firms in long-run competitive equilibrium with free 
entry, H = 1. 
 
P-R test is mainly applied to study competitive environment in banking industry 
(Shaffer 1982, 1983, Nathan and Neave 1991, Yildirim and Philippatos 2007, Bikker 
et al 2012 etc.).  Shaffer (1982, 1983) shows that H is negative for a conjectural 
variations oligopolist or short-run competitor; and equal to unity for a natural 
monopoly in a contestable market or for a firm that maximizes sales subject to a 
breakeven constraint (Table 3.1).   
 
Table 3.1. Properties of P-R H-statistic  
 Average cost curve 
Assumption U-shaped Constant 
   
Market structure   
 
Monopoly H<0 H<0 
 
Oligopoly H<0 H<0 
 
Long-run competition H=1 H<0 or 0<H<1 
 
Short-run competition H<0 but 0<H<1possible  
 
Monopolistic competition 0<H<1 but H<0 possible  
Source: summarized from Shaffer 1982, 1983, Nathan and Neave 1991, Bikker et al. 2012. 
 
There are two P-R test related studies made to container shipping industry. Endo 
(2005) estimates H statistic for top three Japanese container carriers (NYK Line, MOL, 
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K-Line) during 1986 – 2002. The author defines a logarithm linear model derived from 
inductive revenue function with capital costs, labour costs, operation costs and deflated 
GNP as independent variables. The result of H statistics value is 0.54 which indicates 
the top three Japanese container carriers were unable to act as cartel, but rather 
operated in monopolistic competitive condition during the period researched. Sys et al. 
(2011) investigate the competitive conditions in container liner market for the period 
1999 to 2008 (the period before the abolishment of the conference in 2008) for a 
sample of 18 container liner carriers. The authors find the H-statistic during that period 
varies from 0.68 to 0.87, which indicates container liner shipping operates in a 
monopolistic competitive environment. No relevant research has been identified for 
the period from 2009 and onwards.  
 
To conduct P-R test, one estimates a reduced-form revenue function and then 
calculates the test statistic, H, which is the sum of the elasticities of revenue with 
respect to each of the factor prices.  
 
The biggest challenge to conduct P-R test is to gather enough data. Shaffer’s (1982, 
1983) demonstrated an alternative way of obtaining P-R H statistics. The brief 
calculation steps are as follows.  
 
First for the case of single-output, profit maximizing firm in the absence of a zero-
profit condition, the firm’s profit function is, 
 
𝛱(𝑞; 𝑤) = 𝑅(𝑞(𝑤)) − 𝐶(𝑞, 𝑤)       (3.2) 
 
Where R is the firm’s revenue function equal to output price times output quantity 
while quantity itself if a function of input prices, C is the firm’s cost function, q is the 
firm’s output quantity, and w is vector of input prices. Profit maximizing first order 
condition requires, 
 
𝛱𝑞 = 𝑅𝑞 − 𝐶𝑞 = 0         (3.3) 
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By definition the firm’s elasticity of demand is 𝑒 = (𝑝 𝑞⁄ )(𝜕𝑞 𝜕𝑝)⁄  and R=pq, as such, 
 
𝑅𝑞 = 𝑝 + 𝑞 (
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑞
) = 𝑝(
𝑒+1
𝑒
)       (3.4) 
 
Substitute (3.4) into (3.2) to get, 
 
𝛱𝑞 = 𝑝(
𝑒+1
𝑒
) − 𝐶𝑞 = 0       (3.5) 
 
Take second order condition,  
 
𝛱𝑞𝑞 = −
𝑝
𝑒2
𝜕𝑒
𝜕𝑞
+ (
𝑒+1
𝑒
)
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑞
− 𝐶𝑞𝑞      (3.6) 
 
For locally constant demand elasticity (𝜕𝑒 𝜕𝑝 = 0)⁄  and the firm’s cost curve is locally 
linear (𝐶𝑞𝑞 = 0), then the expression reduces to,  
 
𝛱𝑞𝑞 = (
𝑒+1
𝑒
)
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑞
=
𝑝
𝑞
𝑒+1
𝑒2
       (3.7) 
 
Substituting (3.4) (3.7) into (3.1),  
 
𝐻 = 𝑅𝑞
2/𝛱𝑞𝑞𝑅= 𝑝
2(
𝑒+1
𝑒
)2 /R 
𝑝
𝑞
𝑒+1
𝑒2
=  
𝑝𝑞
𝑅
(𝑒 + 1)   (3.8) 
 
Since R=pq, the expression reduces to, 
 
𝐻 = 𝑒 + 1        (3.9)   
 
This study applies Shaffer’s method of obtaining P-R H statistic. The focus is then to 
estimate the demand elasticity most effectively. 
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3.3 Demand Elasticity in Container Liner Industry  
Figure 3.1 and 3.2 demonstrate the movements of freight rate index (price) and actual 
volume of containers (demand) in the six East-West routes during 2009 to 2014. 
 
Figure 3.1. Freight rate index movements in 2009 - 2014 
Source: CTS 
 
Figure 3.2. Demand movements in 2009 - 2014 
Source: PIERS & CTS 
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Legends of figure 3.1 and 3.2: 
TAEP: Trans-Atlantic Eastbound Price 
TAEQ: Trans-Atlantic Eastbound Demand 
TAWP: Trans-Atlantic Westbound Price 
TAWQ: Trans-Atlantic Westbound Demand 
AEWP: Asia Europe Westbound Price 
AEWQ: Asia Europe Westbound Demand 
AEEP: Asia Europe Eastbound Price 
AEEQ: Asia Europe Eastbound Demand 
TPWP: Trans-Pacific Westbound Price 
TPWQ: Trans-Pacific Westbound Demand 
TPEP: Trans-Pacific Eastbound Price 
TPEQ: Trans-Pacific Eastbound Demand 
 
The plots intuitively indicate different moving patterns in the six East-West routes over 
time. A static specification will not be sufficient, since it does not take into account the 
fact that behavioural change in response to changes in price may take time to come 
about. For example, movement towards equilibrium may be delayed due to 
imperfections in alternative transport markets, and stickiness in changes to loyalty 
contract. Thus, elasticity estimates from a static model only account for adjustments 
in the current time period and may actually produce short- or intermediate-run 
estimates. 
 
To separate short-run and long-run responses in demand to a change in price, a 
dynamic model is applied in this study. There are several approaches to dynamic 
models (Oum et al. 1992, Maddala 1997, Graham et al. 2009) with varying lag 
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specification nested. A simple Auto-regressive Distributed Lag (ADL) model is 
applied in this study to estimate the short-run and long-run elasticities. 
 
First, define a basic double log model, 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐷𝑡
∗ = 𝑏0 + 𝑏1 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑡 + 𝑏2 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑡 + 𝜈𝑡      (3.10) 
 
where 𝐷𝑡
∗ is desired demand in FEUs (Forty-foot Equivalent Unit) at time t, 𝑃𝑡 is real 
price. 𝑌𝑡 is GDP per capita and 𝜈𝑡 is an error term.    
 
Since imperfection exists in container liner shipping market, adjustment of supply and 
costs agents cannot realize their desired holdings immediately. A partial adjustment 
model is applied to factor the delay of responses. 
 
Since desired demand (𝐷𝑡
∗)  is not observable, we cannot estimate the demand model 
directly. Denoting observed demand as 𝐷𝑡, the following equation holds,  
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐷𝑡 −  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐷𝑡−1 = 𝛿(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐷𝑡
∗ −  𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐷𝑡−1)   ( δ ≤ 1)  (3.11) 
 
Where δ is the partial adjustment coefficient.  
 
The partial adjustment hypotheses are,   
 
δ = 1 means observed changes are equal to desired changes in container capacity 
demand, or full adjustment. 
δ < 1 agents are only able to fulfil changes they desired partially.  
  
Replace 𝐷𝑡
∗ and solve for 𝐷𝑡 to get, 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐷𝑡 = 𝛿𝑏0 + 𝛿𝑏1 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑡 + 𝛿 𝑏2𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑌𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿)𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝜈𝑡   (3.12) 
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This can be written as, 
  
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐷𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑡 + 𝜃 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑡 + 𝛾𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐷𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡     (3.13) 
 
Where  ≡  𝑏0/𝛿, β ≡ 𝑏1/𝛿, 𝜃 ≡  𝑏2/𝛿, 𝛾 ≡ 1 − 𝛿 and 𝜇𝑡 ≡ 𝜈𝑡/𝛿. 
 
Increase P today in one unit will change D in β, which is the short-run effect. 
In period t+1, D will continue to change, since past demand has an effect: β 
In period t+2, another effect will be observed: β=2β 
…… 
Addition of all of these effects, or the long-run effect is then, 
 
𝛽 + 𝛽𝛾 + 𝛽𝛾2 + 𝛽𝛾3 + ⋯ = 𝛽/(1 − 𝛾)     (3.14) 
 
Using panel data of six East-West routes, the model used for estimation in this 
chapter has the following form:  
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐷𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (3.15)  
 
Where i=1,…,6 (route subscript) and t=1,…,6 (year subscript). 
  
β is the short-run price elasticity of demand and the long run elasticity equals to β/(1-
γ). 
 
3.4 Data and Variables 
Table 3.2 summarises data sources and variable descriptions. 
 
3.4.1  Demand (D)   
Demand data (actual volumes of containers carried) for Trans-Pacific and Trans-
Atlantic routes is sourced from PIERS.  PIERS gathers raw data of waterborne cargo 
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vessels that enter and exit ports in the United States, sourced by U.S. Customs and 
Border Protection. The raw data is subsequently verified, analysed, and synthesized 
with supplementary data sourced from The United Nations, United States Census and 
direct international country sources for use in PIERS trade intelligence tools. PIERS 
data is in FEU (Forty-foot Equivalent Unit). 
 
Table 3.2. Variables and data sources  
Variable Description Source 
D Demand, actual carried volumes in FEU  PIERS[14] & CTS[16] 
P Liner Freight Rate Indices  CTS [18] 
Y 
GDP per capita based on purchasing 
power parity (PPP) paper. 
The World Bank 
 
Demand data for Asia Europe routes is sourced from Container Trades Statistics (CTS). 
CTS database is derived from data supplied by many of the world's major container 
shipping lines. CTS uses the TEU (Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit) data provided to 
estimate total trade volumes for 447 global trades.   
 
3.4.2  Price (P)   
CTS APIs (Aggregated Price Indices) are applied. CTS APIs are weighted average of 
the sea freight rates including all surcharges and ancillary charges except inland 
haulage charges. It has 2008 price index value as 100.  
 
3.4.3  GDP per capita (Y) 
GDP per capita based on purchasing power parity (PPP) is sourced from the World 
Bank. It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets 
or for depletion and degradation of natural resources. Data are in current international 
dollars based on the 2011 International Comparison Program (ICP) round. 
Table 3.3 outlines the descriptive statistics of the regression variables. 
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Table 3.3. Descriptive statistics of the regression variables 
Name Mean St. Dev Minimum Maximum 
D 371750 371750 48018 1405900 
P 88.34 11.13 60.00 109.00 
Y 13582.00 969.55 12107.00 14923.00 
 
3.5 Results 
The short-run demand elasiticities for all of the six routes are statistically significant 
at 10% level against one-sided alternative (Table 3.4). The overall demand elasticities 
for the six East-West routes is statistically insignificant at a level lower than 10%, 
which may imply that levels of competition are different in the six routes. 
 
Table 3.4. Regression results (Dependent varaible: 𝒍𝒐𝒈𝑫𝒕)
 
Variable 
East-West Routes 
TPW TPE TAE TAW AEW AEE ALL 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃𝑡 (𝛽) 
-0.626** 
(0.093) 
-0.137** 
(0.012) 
-0.213* 
(0.049) 
-0.151** 
(0.017) 
-0.572* 
(0.122) 
-0.034* 
(0.010) 
-0.263* 
(0.080) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑌𝑡(𝜃) 
-0.373* 
(0.078) 
0.345* 
(0.087) 
0.791* 
(0.234) 
0.482* 
(0.127) 
2.645* 
(0.601) 
-0.098 
(0.271) 
0.665* 
(0.149) 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐷𝑡−1 (𝛾) 
-0.226 
(0.128) 
-0.364** 
(0.054) 
-0.059 
(0.106) 
0.505** 
(0.062) 
-1.044* 
(0.260) 
0.728* 
(0.127) 
-0.339 
(0.123) 
Constant (𝛼) 
21.643** 
(2.347) 
15.269*** 
(0.301) 
4.998* 
(1.077) 
1.656* 
(0.497) 
4.405 
(2.033) 
4.521* 
(1.062) 
13.716** 
(1.308) 
Durbin h-
statistic 
-0.904 -1.847 -1.383 -1.859 -1.715 -1.389 -1.143 
R-squared adj. 0.899 0.435 0.125 0.992 0.285 0.966 0.712 
Observations 42 
(***denotes significance at the 1% level against one-sided alternative. The estimated coefficients 
without a* are not statistically significant at a level lower than 10%. Standard errors in parenthesis. 
AEW/E=Asia Europe West/East Bound; TPE/W=Trans-Pacific East/West Bound; TAE/W=Trans-
Atlantic East/West Bound.) 
 
                                                     
 The results are estimated per route and bound without taking advantage of panel data. Due to low 
degree of freedom the implication has limitation. However, it clearly indicates different demand 
elasticity in east and west bound in each route. 
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Since lag variable of demand (D) is applied, Durbin h-test (appendix II) is applied to 
test autocorrelation between current D and lagged D. For a test of the null hypothesis 
of no autocorrelation against the two-sided alternative of autocorrelated errors, at a 5% 
level, the decision rule is if -1.96 < h < 1.96 the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. By 
applying this decision rule it can be seen that autocorrelation for the six routes cannot 
be rejected at 5% level of significance. At 10% significant level, the critical value is 
1.645, in which circumstance autocorrelation in three routes TPE, TAW and AEW can 
be rejected. Taking a note that these three routes are the top three routes in terms of 
numbers of containers transported, the model is rather relevant.   
 
There are a few possible causes for autocorrelation: (a) Durbin h-test is not accurate 
for small data samples like this case; (b) misspecification of model; (c) omitted 
variables and (d) systematic errors. Correcting autocorrelation is as such a potential 
future research area when large data sample becomes available. 
 
Adjusted R-squared 0.712 is at high side in viewing to small sample size. All of the 
short-run and long-run P-R H-statistics are greater than zero and less than one (Table 
3.5), which indicates container liner market is in monopolistic competitive condition.  
 
Table 3.5. H-statistic for container liner industry 
 ESR ELR HSR HLR 
TPW 
TPE 
TAE 
TAW 
AEW 
AEE 
-0.63 
-0.14 
-0.21 
-0.15 
-0.57 
-0.03 
-0.51 
-0.10 
-0.20 
-0.31 
-0.28 
-0.12 
0.37 
0.86 
0.79 
0.85 
0.43 
0.97 
0.49 
0.90 
0.90 
0.69 
0.72 
0.88 
The East West Routes -0.28 -0.21 0.72 0.79 
 
Notes: 
ESR: Short-run demand elasticity 
ELR: Longt-run demand elasticity 
HSR: Short-run P-R H statistic 
HLR: Long-run P-R H statistic 
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3.6 Summary 
This chapter takes non-structural approach to test the short-run and long-run demand 
elasticities in container liner shipping industry during 2007 to 2014 in the six East-
West routes. The degree of competition is further estimated following Shaffer’s (1982, 
1983) demonstration of the relationships between demand elasticity and P-R H statistic.  
 
The empirical results suggest container liner shipping industry is in monopolistic 
competition. The outcome is consistent with previous studies for different periods 
made by Endo (2005) and Sys et al. (2011) that the container liner shipping market 
could be described as displaying monopolistic competitive behaviour. 
 
Since CTS price indices have only been measured as of 2008, the study covers only 6 
years period from 2009 to 2014, which is considered as relevantly short span in 
evaluating demand elasticities. Further research may be conducted to use alternative 
variables as proxies to study on longer time span. 
 
There is a limitation in the study. As a matter of fact, many countries are involved in 
each route. For instance, cargoes transported in Asia Europe route could be trade 
between Asian countries, or between European countries, even some of African 
countries. The contribution of each country to the route can as such hardly be measured 
or weighed. Although world GDP per capita is applied in the model to absorb some of 
possible bias, measurement problem may still remain.  
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Chapter 4 The Effect of Container Liner Shipping on 
Economic Growth 
 
In this chapter, unbalanced panel data are used to estimate how container liner shipping 
freight rate and liner connectivity influence economic growth for a sample of 31 
countries over a seven-year period. The fixed and random effects are estimated by 
using the pooled ordinary least squares and feasible generalised least squares methods, 
respectively. The coefficients of both transport costs (using container liner freight rate 
as a proxy) and liner connectivity (liner shipping network integration level) are found 
to be statistically significant at the 5% level. Reducing transport costs do not contribute 
to GDP growth. Further, the estimated effect of liner connectivity on GDP growth is 
greater than that of container liner freight rate, which implies that an increase in liner 
connectivity could be more effective at stimulating trade growth. The main 
contribution of this study is thus quantifying the effects of the container liner shipping 
industry on economic growth. 
 
4.1 Introduction 
Liner container shipping has influenced global trade heavily over the past 50 years. 
Lower transport costs have allowed much lower value cargo to be traded as well as 
cargo from more remote areas to be sold in new markets. Consequently, container liner 
shipping industry has clearly contributed to trade growth in East Asia, notably in China. 
However, few studies have quantified these positive effects or explained their 
implications for the carriers and regulators in other regions. 
 
Containerised transport has been a growing industry for the past 30 years. Between 
1983 and 2006, world GDP growth was 4.8% per year, whereas container cargo growth 
averaged 10% per year (Stopford 2009). This trend has continued in recent years 
according to World Bank data with the exception of 2009 and 2011 when the industry 
suffered the effects of the global financial crisis. According to Alphaliner[11], global 
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container volumes outstripped global GDP growth by 2.7 times during 2000 to 2009 
and by 2.1 times in 2010 to 2012. This long history of rapid growth in containerised 
cargo has led to the expectation of continuous growth in the industry. However, the 
lengthy delivery time for newly built vessels of several years makes the market slow 
to adapt to increased demand, with subsequent huge fluctuations in revenues, as seen 
in the aftermath of the financial crisis in 2009. 
 
This chapter uses unbalanced panel data for 31 countries over a seven-year period to 
estimate the relationships between container liner freight rate, liner connectivity, and 
economic growth. Estimating by using panel data offers a number of advantages. 
Firstly, such data provide a large number of observations on individuals and time, 
which makes the resulting estimates more efficient and asymptotically consistent. 
Secondly, panel data allow us to check the individual and time effects in a regression. 
This approach thus provides more variance than that contained in time series alone, 
allows for individual system-specific heterogeneity to address the problem of omitted 
variable bias, and can reduce the potential for multicollinearity and aid identification. 
However, crucially, for the purpose of this study, the key benefit of panel data is that 
they allow us to derive the consistent effect of liner shipping on economic growth 
despite missing time periods and unobserved effects. Hence, both the fixed effects 
(FE) and random effects (RE) of container liner freight rate and liner connectivity on 
economic growth are estimated. This statistical approach allows system-specific 
heterogeneity and accommodates endogenous regressors. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the literature on 
line freight rate. Section 4.3 outlines the framework and model applied. Section 4.4 
describes the data available for the estimation. Section 4.5 presents the results and the 
final section 4.6 concludes the chapter. 
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4.2 Literature Review and Theoretical Framework 
Previous research has focused on the relationship between shipping and economic 
growth. Many scholars have pointed out that ocean freight rate plays an important role 
in economic growth. The contribution of shipping is often described as that it has 
significantly lowered transport costs. Ocean shipping makes it possible to transport 
large volumes to remote markets. The declining trend of ocean shipping costs up to 
World War I led to rapid growth in trade. Except during the collapse of the gold 
standard in the 1930s (Estevadeordal et al. 2002) and rapid development of air 
transport since the 1970s (Hummels 2007), ocean freight has shown a declining trend 
over time (North 1958, Hummels 2007). This declining cost of transportation has been 
critical to trade growth. 
 
Several studies on the relationships of transport costs and economic growth are 
available. Sampson and Yeats (1977, 1978) assesse the incidence of international 
transport and tariff exports from Australia and the United Kingdom. The authors find 
that the trade barriers imposed by transport costs accentuated the role freight costs 
played in limiting international trade flows, which may indicate the importance of 
formulating measures to reduce transport costs in order to stimulate trade.  
 
Radelet and Sachs (1998) propose a model that GDP growth is a function of shipping 
costs, ratio of coastal line to land area, openness and nature resource abundance. The 
authors find strong relationship between shipping costs and economic growth and 
suggest that geographic isolation and higher shipping costs may make it ‘much more 
difficult if not impossible for relatively isolated countries to succeed in promoting 
manufactured exports’.  
 
Raballand et al. (2005) explore the role of transportation costs in weakening trade 
between the European Union (EU) and Central Asia. The authors argue that transport 
costs play an important role in causing Central Asian countries to generate far less 
trade with the EU than their relative location would suggest.   
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Behar and Venables (2010) develop a model that trade as a function of income, policy 
and transport costs, where transport costs are determined by factors such as distance, 
geography, infrastructure, trade facilitation, technology, fuel costs. The authors 
suggest transport costs impact international trade and vice versa. Both are influenced 
by geography, technology, infrastructure, fuel costs and policy towards trade 
facilitation.  
 
Bernhofen et al. (2013) suggest that containerisation stimulates trade in containerisable 
products (e.g. auto parts) and has complementary effects on non-containerisable 
products (e.g. automobiles). Research on modelling the relationship between GDP and 
liner transport costs has been scarce. 
 
The framework applied in this chapter is derived from the macroeconomic identity. 
For any economy, GDP (Y) is the sum of consumption (C), investment (I), 
government spending (G), and net exports (NX). Hence, the following equations 
hold: 
 
𝑌 = 𝐶 + 𝐼 + 𝐺 + 𝑁𝑋       (4.1) 
𝑁𝑋 = 𝐸𝑋 − 𝐼𝑀        (4.2) 
 
where EX is exports and IM is imports. Since EX and IM are composed of commodity 
value (CV) and transport costs (TC), we write 
 
𝐸𝑋 = 𝐶𝑉𝑒 + 𝑇𝐶𝑒       (4.3) 
𝐼𝑀 = 𝐶𝑉𝑖 + 𝑇𝐶𝑖       (4.4) 
 
By substituting (4.3) and (4.4) into (4.2), we have 
 
𝑁𝑋 = 𝐶𝑉𝑒 − 𝐶𝑉𝑖 + 𝑇𝐶𝑒 − 𝑇𝐶𝑖     (4.5) 
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Since more than 75% of international transport is containerised (Notteboom and 
Rodrigue 2008), container liner freight rate index is used as a proxy of transport costs. 
Although there is a trade imbalance between inbound and outbound liner freight rates, 
they are proportional in the long-term. For instance, Asia/Europe eastbound freight 
rate is about 25% of westbound based on the World Container Index (WCI)[19]. 
Denote liner freight rate as fr and define it thus, 
 
𝑓(𝑓𝑟) = 𝑇𝐶𝑒 − 𝑇𝐶𝑖        (4.6) 
 
By substituting (4.5) and (4.6) into (4.1), the below equation holds, 
 
Y = C + I + G + 𝐶𝑉𝑒 − 𝐶𝑉𝑖 + 𝑓(𝑓𝑟)     (4.7) 
 
Equation (4.7) indicates the relationship between GDP and container liner freight rate 
(fr). It is then possible to measure the partial impact of liner freight rate on GDP.  
4.3 Empirical Statistical Model 
A few explanations need to be made to define the empirical model. 
 
a) More than 75% of international transport is containerised (Notteboom and 
Rodrigue 2008). 
 
b) Export transport costs and import transport costs are different and proportional 
in average, for instance, in average freight rate in Asia Europe eastbound route 
is about 25% of that in westbound route as per WCI.  
 
c) The effects of the other factors (C, I, G, CVe , CVi)) are not measured in this 
model. GDP growth rate instead of GDP is applied in the model to eliminate 
omitted variable bias.  
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d) In addition, statistical measures are taken to control unobserved variable bias: 
control country factor in FE model and estimate with a RE model. (Wooldridge 
2002).  
 
The basic FE model as such can be written as,  
 
𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝜃𝑖 ∑ 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖
30
𝑖=1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (4.8) 
 
Introducing another variable, namely liner service connectivity (lcdi, see the 
description in Section 4.3), controlling for bound (bound), country (country), and year 
(yr), and denoting GDP growth rate as gr, the estimated FE model has the following 
form: 
 
𝑔𝑟𝑖𝑡 = 𝛾0 + 𝛾1𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾2𝑙𝑐𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝜂𝑏𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 + 𝜃𝑖 ∑ 𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦𝑖
30
𝑖=1 + 𝜏𝑡 ∑ 𝑦𝑟𝑡
6
𝑡=1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
         (4.9) 
 
for i =1,…,30 and t =1,…,6 (t is the annual observation of country i), where 𝜀𝑖𝑡 is the 
error term.  Because annual data are used, seasonal effects do not need to be modelled. 
 
Since unbalanced panel data are used, a RE regression is performed to test whether the 
missing time periods are systematically related to the idiosyncratic errors. The RE 
model using the feasible generalised least squares (FGLS) estimation corrects serial 
correlation in the errors of multiple regressors (Wooldridge 2002, 2003). By using RE, 
one can thus efficiently account for any remaining serial correlation due to unobserved 
time-constant factors. 
 
To derive the GLS transformation, first define a linear regression model with the 
composed error term, 
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑥𝑖𝑡1 + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑘 + 𝜐𝑖𝑡    (4.10) 
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where 𝜐𝑖𝑡 = 𝑎𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖𝑡. Here, 𝑎𝑖is the unobserved effect fixed over time and 𝜇𝑖𝑡 is the 
idiosyncratic error serially correlated across time t and section i. 
 
Under the RE assumptions,  
 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑣𝑖𝑡, 𝑣𝑖𝑠) = 𝜎𝜇
2/(𝜎𝜇
2 + 𝜎𝛼
2), 𝑡 ≠ 𝑠    (4.11) 
 
where 𝜎𝑢
2 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑖𝑡) , 𝜎𝑎
2 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑎𝑖).  
  
Define, 
 
𝜆 = 1 − [𝜎𝜇
2/(𝜎𝜇
2 + 𝑇𝜎𝛼
2)]
1
2⁄       [T=max(0, t)]   (4.12) 
 
which is between zero and one. Then, the transformed equation is written as  
 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 − 𝜆𝑦?̅? = 𝛽0(1 − 𝜆) + 𝛽1(𝑥𝑖𝑡1 − 𝜆?̅?𝑖1) + ⋯ + 𝛽𝑘(𝑥𝑖𝑡𝑘 − 𝜆?̅?𝑖𝑘) + (𝜐𝑖𝑡 − 𝜆?̅?𝑖) 
         (4.13) 
 
where the overbar denotes the time averages. The RE transformation subtracts a 
proportion of that time average, where the proportion depends on 𝜎𝑢
2 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑖𝑡), 
𝜎𝑎
2 = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑎𝑖), and the number of time periods. 
 
The transformation in (4.13) allows for constant explanatory variables over time, 
which is one advantage of RE models over FE models. This is possible because RE 
assumes that the unobserved effect is uncorrelated with all the explanatory variables, 
whether fixed over time or not. If the full set of RE assumptions holds, the RE 
estimator is asymptotically more efficient than the FE one. 
 
The autocorrelation AR(1) is applied to obtain the value of parameter ̂. The RE 
estimator is the GLS estimator that uses ̂ instead of . 
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Finally, Hausman (1978) specification test (Appendix I) is applied to test the 
difference between the RE and FE estimates. This study also uses Hausman’s method 
to test the exogeneity of the variables. 
 
4.4 Data and Variables  
Table 4.1 summarises data sources and variable description.  
Table 4.1. Variables and data sources  
Variable Description Source 
gr GDP growth at market prices The World Bank 
fr Container Liner Freight Rate Index Drewry [19] 
lcdi Liner Service Connectivity Index UNCTAD 
 
4.4.1  GDP Growth (gr)  
GDP growth is sourced from the World Bank. It is calculated as the annual percentage 
growth rate of GDP at market prices based on a constant local currency. Aggregates 
are based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars. No deductions for the depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for the depletion and degradation of natural resources are made. 
As noted earlier, GDP growth rate instead of GDP or GDP per capita is adopted in the 
models to eliminate possible unobserved variable bias. 
 
4.4.2 Container Liner Freight Rate Index (fr) 
This variable is measured with the freight rate index reported by Drewry’s WCI for 
the period of 2007 to 2013. This reports the actual spot container freight rates for the 
major East–West trade routes. The indices are reported in USD per 40 feet container, 
while WCI rates are reported on a container yard to container yard basis inclusive of 
surcharges associated with the transport of goods. 
 
In common practice, container liner freight rate is offered based on the main ports 
(MP) concept. For instance, the rates per 40 feet dry container from East Asian MP to 
North European MP are typically the same. By contrast, rates to non-MP or outports 
are often offered with a standard add-on to MP rates and fluctuate in line with the MP 
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rate. Hence, all available container freight rate indices report fluctuations in the MP 
rate. Of the 11 route-specific indices reported by the WCI, four MP-based routes of 
larger volumes are chosen. The fours routes are from Shanghai to Rotterdam (one of 
the MP in North Europe), to Genoa (one of the MP in the Mediterranean), to Los 
Angeles (one of the MP on the West Coast of the United States), and to New York (one 
of the MP on the East Coast of the United States).  
 
4.4.3 Liner Service Connectivity Index (lcdi) 
This index captures the extent to which countries are connected to global shipping 
networks. It is computed by UNCTAD based on five components of the maritime 
transport sector: (a) the number of ships; (b) the total container-carrying capacity of 
those ships; (c) the maximum vessel size; (d) the number of services; and (e) the 
number of companies that deploy container ships on services from and to a country’s 
ports. For each component, a country’s value is divided by the maximum value of each 
component in 2004. The five components are then averaged for each country, and the 
average is divided by the maximum average for 2004 and multiplied by 100. The index 
generates a value of 100 for the country with the highest average index in 2004. 
 
Assuming that higher liner connectivity stimulates trade activities, the coefficient of 
lcdi is expected to be positive. Basis on the routes selected, the countries involved are 
China, where the load port Shanghai is located, and 30 other countries (Appendix III) 
in Europe and North America where the destination ports are located. 
 
4.4.4 Control Variables: year (yr), country (country) and bound (bound) 
dummies 
Country is controlled in the FE model to eliminate possible bias caused by omitted 
variable. Taking account of liner freight rate cycles (Stopford 2009, Wijnolst and 
Wergeland 2009), year is further controlled to test the potential time impact. 
 
In container liner shipping market, the trade nature is different for inbound (import) 
and outbound (export) market. As such, bound dummy variable is controlled to test 
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the effect of the trade imbalance on economic growth. The bound dummy has a value 
of zero if the country’s outbound freight rate level is higher than its inbound freight 
rate level (or the export containerised volume is greater than the import containerised 
volume) and one otherwise. 
 
The data available (Table 4.2) for the estimation are for 2007–2013 for 22 countries in 
Europe and eight countries in North America, in addition to China where the port of 
loading is located.  
 
Table 4.2. Descriptive Statistics of the Regression Variables 
Name Mean St. Dev Minimum Maximum 
gr 1.14 4.39 -17.96 14.16 
fr 40.52 35.57 2.40 157.51 
lcdi 2495.00 652.51 1362.00 3321.00 
 
4.5  Results 
The Hausman statistic (Appendix I) for fr and lcdi is 6.16 distributed chi-square with 
a 1 degree of freedom. Given that the 5% critical value is 3.84, the two variables are 
thus exogenous. Our models are therefore consistent. 
 
The feasible GLS parameter obtained by using AR(1) is 0.496. Since OLS and FGLS 
are different estimation procedures, the parameters in the estimation results vary. The 
Hausman statistic for the OLS and FGLS estimates is 0.837 distributed chi-square with 
9 degrees of freedom. Hence, the null hypothesis holds at 1% significance level, which 
indicates that both models are consistent and that the FGLS estimate is more efficient. 
The FGLS estimator is thus preferred to the OLS estimator since it has a smaller 
standard deviation and the FGLS test statistics are asymptotically valid. The RE results 
estimated by FGLS suggest fr (liner freight rate) is statistically significant at the 5% 
level, ceteris paribus one percentage point increase in fr increases gr (GDP growth) by 
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approximately 0.0014 percentage points (Table 4.3). The full estimate results are listed 
in Appendix IV.  
 
 
Table 4.3. Regression results (Dependent variable: gr) 
Variable            FE 
          OLS 
RE 
Feasible GLS(=0.496) 
Fr 0.0026*** 
(0.001) 
0.0014** 
(0.001) 
Lcdi -0.0333 
(0.045) 
0.0187** 
(0.009) 
Bound 2.9531*** 
(1.100) 
4.1502***  
(0.831) 
yr08 -1.9067** 
(0.764) 
-2.3440***  
(0.602) 
yr09 -4.9628***  
(1.539) 
-6.9051***  
(1.198) 
yr10 -2.6944***  
(0.730) 
-2.7116***  
(0.749) 
yr11 1.2401  
(1.266) 
-0.2998  
(1.069) 
yr12 -2.7726***  
(0.949) 
-3.8731*** 
(0.870) 
yr13 -1.6537  
(1.176) 
-3.2079***  
(1.010) 
Constant -2.6782 
(3.196) 
-1.0809 
(2.084) 
R-squared adj. 0.499 0.435 
Observations 217 217 
***denotes significance at the 1% level against the two-sided alternative. The estimated coefficients 
without a* are not statistically significant at a level lower than 10%. Standard errors in parentheses.  
 
The RE regression results also show that lcdi (liner connectivity) are statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Ceteris paribus one point increase in lcdi increases gr (GDP 
growth) by 0.0187 percentage points. Moreover, the coefficients of the bound dummy 
in both models are statistically significant at the 1% level. The effect of inbound 
volumes have on GDP growth is about four times of that the outbound volumes. 
 
Compared with 2007, except 2011, the impacts of the other years are less than that of 
2007. This finding concurs with the occurrence of the global financial crisis in 2008 
and Eurozone meltdown in 2011. 
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Interestingly the coefficient of lcdi has opposite sign in the FE and RE models. 
Globalisation raises the incentive for manufacturers to produce in countries with 
relevant low-cost access. This trend impacts GDP growth rate in all countries involved. 
The non-positive relationship of lcdi and gr (GDP growth) in the FE model reflects 
the impact of globalisation on trade growth. The positive coefficient of lcdi in the RE 
model matches the expectation on the relationship of the two variables as addressed in 
section 4.4.4. 
 
The test results for the trade imbalance suggest that inbound (import) trade volumes 
have a larger impact on economic growth than outbound (export) trade volumes. This 
finding may be explained that in addition to the effect of logistics flows on GDP, the 
domestic consumption of import goods promotes economic growth. The main 
contribution of this study is thus quantifying the relationship between liner shipping 
and economic growth in terms of liner transport costs and liner connectivity. 
 
4.6  Summary  
This study uses unbalanced panel data on container liner freight rate and liner service 
connectivity to estimate the responsiveness of GDP growth to changes in liner shipping 
factors. An unbalanced panel estimation accommodates individual system-specific 
heterogeneity, endogenous regressors, and measurement error. Therefore, compared 
with the FE model, the results from the RE model are more efficient.  
 
The empirical results reveal that the effect of liner freight rate on GDP growth is 
statistically significant at the 5% level and that the effect of liner freight rate (transport 
costs) is non-negative in contrast to the conclusions of the studies reviewed in Section 
2. This non-decreasing relationship suggests that reducing transport costs does not 
contribute to GDP growth. Further, the coefficient of liner connectivity is statistically 
significant, positive, and substantially higher than that of liner freight rate. The 
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implication of this finding is that an increase in liner connectivity may be more 
effective at stimulating economic growth. 
 
This study also finds that import and export has different level of impact on GDP 
growth. Import trade volumes have a larger impact on economic growth than export 
trade volumes. In addition, globalisation of product manufacturing has impact on the 
growth rate of GDP in countries involved. 
 
This study has two limitations. First, the freight rate data used are container liner 
freight rate indices for the Shanghai–Europe and Shanghai–US routes published by 
Drewry. The choice of these routes is limited by data availability. Although 
acknowledging that outport rates are formed as the MP rate plus an add-on, the choice 
may still lead to bias or measurement problems because sample countries do not have 
similar proportions of import and export trade on these routes. Second, country-level 
data is used without considering the trade volume of each country, which may bias the 
conclusions drawn. Future research may thus aim to deflate the weighting of a 
country’s trade volume in the model as well as identify more independent variables. 
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Chapter 5 Conclusion and Future Research  
Ocean shipping since its birth has significantly contributed to world trade growth. 
Invention of container ship further reduces transport cost through cargo 
containerisation. More than 75% of world trade volumes are carried in containers 
(Notteboom and Rodrigue 2008). Container liner shipping industry is undoubtedly 
one of the most important sectors in world transport.  It is of great value to study market 
structure of contemporary container liner industry as well as its impact to economic 
growth. 
 
This dissertation contributes to above subject, applying to both industrial statistics and 
academic theories. It contains three studies. The first research tests the effect of market 
concentration level on container liner freight rates. The result suggests contemporary 
container liner market is contestable. The second research taking non-structural 
approach explores the degree of competition in container liner market. The degree of 
competition measured by P-R H statistic ranges from 0.72 to 0.79, which implies 
container liner market is in oligopolistic competition. The conclusion is consistent with 
that in previous research. The last research quantifies the contribution of container 
liner shipping to economic growth. The empirical results imply that reduction of liner 
freight rate does not contribute to trade growth. With majority of trade volumes 
containerised, and overall decreasing trend of transport costs during the entire ocean 
shipping history, transport costs have reached to a valley point. Further reduction of 
transport costs would not contribute to trade growth. 
 
5.1 Method and Major Outcome 
One of the major outcomes is to empirically prove that container liner shipping market 
is competitive during the period researched. The result reveals that formation of large 
alliance does not hamper competition. Instead, it offers a solution to carriers to lower 
unit operational cost hence to survive deteriorated freight rate market. The conclusion 
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offers insights to policy maker, since market structure is important information for 
policy-making. The conclusion also offers great reference to carriers, since market 
structure determines carrier’s behaviour in the market. 
 
The second major outcome is to find that static equilibrium does not exist in 
contemporary container liner shipping market. Formation of alliance allows member 
lines to enjoy lower level of marginal cost, until new entrants joined. When price is 
too low for most carriers to be break even, some carriers opt to reduce capacity or 
withdrawn from certain markets (routes). As such, equilibrium point shifts with the 
movements of industry average cost triggered by technology advance or reforming of 
alliance. 
 
The third major outcome is to estimate the short-run and long-run demand elasticity 
and the degree of competition in latest container liner shipping market. Research on 
demand elasticity of container liner shipping sector has been scarce. This study does 
not only provide a preliminary research of demand elasticity for container industry, 
but also separates short-run and long-run effects. The empirical results suggest that 
container Liner Shipping industry could be described as displaying monopolistic 
competitive behaviour. Comparing with conclusions from previous research, an 
increasing trend of P-R H statistic in the industry, which may be interpreted as that 
container liner industry encounters increasing degree of competitiveness. 
 
The final major outcome is to quantify the effects of container liner industry on 
economic growth. Different from conclusions in relevant previous research literature, 
this study indicated reducing transport costs do not contribute to trade growth.  
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5.2 Originality and Impacts of Study 
All of the three studies in the dissertation apply data for container liner shipping market 
in last seven years. Methods applied in the research differs from those used in previous 
literature in two perspectives. First, the dynamic model applied in chapter 3 separates 
short-run and long-run demand elasticities. Second, the macroeconomic that approach 
applied in chapter 4 that quantify the relationship of liner freight and GDP growth. To 
the best of my knowledge, this series of studies in the dissertation are the only ones 
that quantify container liner shipping market during the corresponding period. 
 
The study also contributes to new way of evaluation to the effect of container liner 
industry on economic growth. The conclusion drawn from chapter 4 differs from those 
in previous study. Transport costs have been overall declining over entire ocean 
shipping history, except in 1930s during the collapse of gold standard and in 1970s 
when the aviation industry developed rapidly. Current market has little room for 
transport costs to further decline. Instead increasing of transport cost concurs with a 
country’s economy growth.  
 
5.3 Limitations of Study 
The limitations are twofold. First, the data available for estimation is for the period 
from 2008 onwards when the container liner freight rate indices have been measured. 
Six to seven years of time span is relevantly short in evaluating the market behaviours 
in container liner shipping industry.  
 
The second limitation is missing measurement of country specific effect. The studies 
focus on each market (route) in container liner shipping industry. During to existence 
of transhipment cargo, unspecified countries may contribute to the transport in the 
market. There is no effective way available to deflate each country’s contribution. 
Unobserved country effects are partially absorbed by including country dummies in 
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chapter 4 and applying world average GDP per capita in chapter 3, nonetheless  the 
solution may still cause statistic bias or measurement problems.  
 
5.4 Future Prospects 
More than 75% of world transport has been containerised (Notteboom and Rodrigue 
2008), and the trend is expected to increase with advancement of technology. 
Containers are invented to carry goods in temperate as low as minus 60 Celsius degree 
or with air supply for live fishes.  The increasing ratio of containerisation calls for 
thorough study to the industry in depth. The knowledge gap between industrial 
professionals and academic scholars needs to be constantly narrowed. 
 
The scope of future study is expected to investigate the container liner freight rate 
structure and to elicit the role of container liner shipping industry for economy. The 
potential topics for further study include: 
a. Identification and quantification of factors influencing liner freight rate 
movements.  
b. Forecast of container liner freight rate market and shipping cycles. 
c. Continuous investigation on the role of container liner shipping industry to 
economic growth. 
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Notes  
[1]Shanghai Container Freight Index (SFCI) has officially been measured as of 
October 16th 2009. http://en.sse.net.cn/indices/ccfinew.jsp    
 
[2]Greg Knowler, 2015, CMA CGM signs exclusivity deal for NOL acquisition. 
http://www.joc.com/maritime-news/container-lines/cma-cgm/cma-cgm-signs-
exclusivity-deal-nol-acquisition_20151122.html 
 
[3]EUROPEAN LINERS AFFAIRS ASSOCIATION, 2003, The European 
Commission Consultation Paper on the Review of Council Regulation (EEC) 
4056/86 of 22nd December 1986. 
 
[4]The Code was adopted in Geneva in April 1974, to become effective six months 
after ratification by at least 24 nations controlling 25% of the world's tonnage. 
UNCTAD, United Nations Conference of  Plenipotentiaries on a Code of Conduct 
for Liner Conferences, vol. II, Final Act(including the Convention and resolutions) 
and tonnage requirements Annex I (Art. 49) at 18, U.N.Doe. TD/CODE/13/Add. 1 
(1975) [http://unctad.org/en/PublicationsLibrary/tdcode13add.1_en.pdf]. This was 
accomplished in April 1983, when 58 countries representing 28.6% of the world's 
liner tonnage (measured in 1974) had ratified the UNCTAD Code. For a list of 
signatories see, 22 Int'l Leg. Mat. 1227. 
 
[5]PR News, January 22, 1998. http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/new-
world-alliance-begins-transition-to-new-worldwide-ship-deployment-
76391507.html 
 
[6]The Maritime Executive, November 20, 2011.  http://www.maritime-
executive.com/article/six-container-shipping-lines-form-giant-vessel-network-in-
new-g6-alliance 
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[7]Maerskline website, July 10, 2014. http://www.maerskline.com/de-
at/countries/int/news/news-articles/2014/07/trades-with-msc 
 
[8]CMA-CGM website, September 9, 2014. https://www.cma-
cgm.com/news/565/cma-cgm-signs-three-agreements-on-the-biggest-worldwide-
maritime-trades-with-china-shipping-container-lines-cscl-and-united-arab-
shipping-company-uasc-  
 
[9]Evergreen website, October 21, 2014. http://www.evergreen-
line.com/tuf1/jsp/TUF1_Html.jsp?page=TBN1_141021.jsp 
 
[10]Peter T. Leach, 2015, Shippers, regulators will be watching closely as alliances 
launch services. http://www.joc.com/maritime-news/container-lines/ocean-
three/shippers-regulators-will-be-watching-closely-alliances-launch-
services_20150107.html 
 
[11]http://www.alphaliner.com/ 
 
[12]Source: Compare data & carrier websites. 
 
[13]U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission, 2010. Horizontal  
Merger Guidelines. http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-
2010.html#5c 
 
[14]http://www.joc.com/group/joc-group/piers 
 
[15]http://www.drewry.co.uk/publications/view_publication.php?id=358 
 
[16]https://www.containerstatistics.com/ 
 
[17]Data for 2008 is not available. 
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[18]CTS APIs (Aggregated Price Indices) are weighted average of the sea freight 
rates including all surcharges and ancillary charges except inland haulage charges. 
Price index: 2008 =100. https://www.containerstatistics.com/faq#api1 
[19]The World Container Index assessed by Drewry reports actual spot container 
freight rates for major East West trade routes. 
http://www.worldcontainerindex.com/index.php?mode=staticContent&id=method
ology  
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Appendices 
I. Hausman Specification Test 
In the empirical model if the causal relationship between HHI and Q exists, the OLS 
estimation would be biased. To test exogeneity of the two variables, Hausman (1978) 
specification test is applied by comparing instrumental variable (IV) estimates to 
ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates. The Hausman specification test compares the 
difference between the two estimators. Under the null hypotheses, IV and OLS 
converge to the same value, but OLS will be more efficient. Under the alternate 
hypothesis, they will converge to different value. 
 
To apply Hausman inspection test, first define an IV model with Z representing the 
function of Q and HHI, where HHI is an instrument variable:  
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑍 + 𝜀       (App.1) 
 
Then define the OLS model as: 
 
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑃 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑄 + 𝜐      (App.2) 
 
Next use Hausman specification test to decide whether the instrument improves the 
estimation as following equation (App.2) distributed chi-square with 1 degree of 
freedom.   
 
𝐻 =
(?̂?1−?̂?1 )
2
𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̂?1)−𝑣𝑎𝑟(?̂?1)
 ~ 𝜒1
2      (App.3) 
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Where ?̂?1 and ?̂?1 are the coefficients of the IV and OLS model respectively. Under the 
null hypothesis, the two variables Q and HHI are exogenous. But under the alternative 
hypothesis the two variables are endogenous and OLS will be biased and inconsistent. 
 
II. Durbin h-test 
The most popular test for autocorrelation is the Durbin-Watson (DW) test. DW test is 
only applicable to first order Autoregressive systems. If there is a lagged endogenous 
variable, Durbin h-test should be applied instead.   
 
Durbin h-test is calculated basis on DW-test. First for DW test, consider a model, 
 
Yt  = 0 + 1 X1t  + 2 X2t  + t     (App.4) 
 
And suppose, 
t =  t-1 + vt    where,  |ρ| ≤ 1    (App.5) 
where   is  the autocorrelation coefficient and vt  is a random error.  
 
The null hypothesis   Ho:  = 0 (no serial correlation) 
The alternative hypothesis Ha: 0    
 
To test the hypothesis DW calculates an estimate of  from the regression residuals: 
 
2
1
2
2
1
ˆ ˆ( )
ˆ
N
t t
t
N
t
t
DW
 








       (App.6) 
 
The DW statistics lies in the range zero to 4. 
0 4DW  . 
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It can be shown that, 
ˆ2(1 )DW          (App.7) 
 
When ˆ 0   (no serial correlation) DW = 2 
When ˆ  tends to 1 (perfect positive first order serial correlation) DW = 0 
When ˆ  tends to -1 (perfect negative first order serial correlation) DW = 4 
 
Durbin h-statistic can be obtained in following manner: 
 
Estimate a model with OLS: 
1t t t tY X Y             (App.8) 
 
The Durbin h-statistic is defined as: 
ˆ
ˆ1 [ ( )]
T
h
T Var




      (App.9) 
 
T = the number of observations 
ˆ = the estimated correlation coefficient of the residuals, that is the autocorrelation 
coefficient of the residuals 
ˆ( )Var   = the variance of the coefficient on the lagged dependent variable 
 
Solving for ˆ  and substituting, the Durbin h-statistic can be written as: 
1
ˆ2 1 [ ( )]
DW T
h
T Var 
 
  
 
     (App.10) 
 
Durbin h-statistic is approximately normally distributed with a unit variance, hence 
the test for first order serial correlation can be done using the standard normal 
distribution. However, as it well self-explains, that if ˆ[ ( )]T Var   is greater than one, 
then the ratio with the square root becomes negative and this test cannot be applied. 
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III. List of countries (Chapter 4) 
CONTINENT COUNTRY CONTINENT COUNTRY 
North America Antigua and Barbuda 
Europe Germany 
North America Bahamas 
Europe Greece 
North America Belize 
Europe Ireland 
North America Canada 
Europe Italy 
North America Honduras 
Europe Latvia 
North America Panama 
Europe Lithuania 
North America 
St Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
Europe 
Malta 
North America United States 
Europe Netherlands 
Europe Belgium Europe Poland 
Europe Bulgaria Europe Portugal 
Europe Cyprus Europe Romania 
Europe Denmark Europe Slovenia 
Europe Estonia Europe Spain 
Europe Finland Europe Sweden 
Europe France Europe United Kingdom 
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IV. Full estimation results (Chapter 4) 
GDP Growth Fixed Effects (OLS) Random Effects (Feasible GLS) 
Variable Coef. SE Coef. SE 
p 0.0026*** 0.0009 0.0014** 0.0006 
lcdi -0.0333 0.0445 0.0187** 0.0093 
bound 2.9531*** 1.0999 4.1502*** 0.8312 
yr08 -1.9067** 0.7645 -2.3440*** 0.6022 
yr09 -4.9628*** 1.5394 -6.9051*** 1.1984 
yr10 -2.6944*** 0.7304 -2.7116*** 0.7486 
yr11 1.2401 1.2664 -0.2998 1.0694 
yr12 -2.7726*** 0.9491 -3.8731*** 0.8699 
yr13 -1.6537 1.1760 -3.2079*** 1.0103 
cn2 5.8325*** 1.8088 
- - 
cn3 6.8483*** 1.4818 
- - 
cn4 7.8721*** 2.2536 
- - 
cn5 7.6088*** 1.5080 
- - 
cn6 12.6105*** 2.2750 
- - 
cn7 2.2347 1.4759 
- - 
cn8 8.8797** 4.0005 
- - 
cn9 9.6429** 3.7770 
- - 
cn10 7.9783*** 1.5263 
- - 
cn11 17.6712*** 6.5783 
- - 
cn12 6.7615*** 1.6144 
- - 
cn13 6.6371*** 1.9362 
- - 
cn14 6.9892*** 1.5269 
- - 
cn15 6.5353*** 1.5566 
- - 
cn16 9.0464*** 3.3270 
- - 
cn17 10.0612** 4.1156 
- - 
cn18 3.6824** 2.1212 
- - 
cn19 6.1658*** 1.5440 
- - 
cn20 7.2423** 3.0925 
- - 
cn21 8.1329*** 1.5376 
- - 
cn22 6.5440*** 1.5259 
- - 
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GDP Growth Fixed Effects (OLS) Random Effects (Feasible GLS) 
Variable Coef. SE Coef. SE 
cn23 9.5438*** 2.1816 
- - 
cn24 9.5383** 4.0774 
- - 
cn25 10.5356*** 1.7545 
- - 
cn26 6.5696*** 2.0680 
- - 
cn27 8.6463*** 1.7429 
- - 
cn28 6.8295*** 1.6731 
- - 
cn29 8.1333** 3.4121 
- - 
cn30 8.3191*** 2.0466 
- - 
cn31 9.4452** 3.8823 
- - 
constant -10.5021*** 3.0230 -1.0809 2.0837 
***denotes significance at the 1% level against the two-sided alternative. The estimated 
coefficients without a* are not statistically significant at a level lower than 10%. Standard errors 
in parentheses.  
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V. Abbreviations of liner carriers, conference and shipping alliances 
APL   American President Lines, Ltd. (merged into NOL in 1997) 
ChoYang  Cho Yang Shipping Co. Ltd. 
COSCO  China Ocean Shipping Company 
CSG  China Shipping Group 
DSR/Senator  DSR/Senator Lines, GmbH 
Evergreen  Evergreen Marine Corp. (Taiwan) Ltd. 
E-W routes Six East-West routes are Asia Europe Westbound (AEW) and 
Eastbound (AEE), Trans-Pacific Eastbound (TPE) and Westbound 
(TPW), Trans-Atlantic Eastbound (TAE) and Westbound (TAW) 
Hanjin  Hanjin Shipping Company Ltd. 
Hapag Lloyd  Hapag-Lloyd Containerlinie GmbH 
HYMM  Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., Ltd. 
K-Line  Kawasaki Kisen Kaish Ltd. 
Maersk  A. P. Moller-Maersk, also known as APMM 
MSC  Mediterranean Shipping Co. SA 
MOL   Mitsui-OSK Lines Ltd. 
Nedlloyd  Nedlloyd Lines 
NOL   Neptune Orient Lines Ltd.  (Acquired APL in 1997) 
NYK   Nippon Yusen Kaisha 
OOCL  Orient Overseas Container Line 
P&O   P&O Containers Ltd. (Acquired by APMM in 2005) 
UASC  United Arab Shipping Company 
Sealand  Sea-Land Service, Inc. (Merged by APMM in 1999) 
Yang Ming  Yang Ming Marine Transport Corp. 
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FEFC  Far Eastern Freight Conference 
2M   Alliance consists of carrier Maersk Line and MSC 
CKYHE          Alliance consists of COSCO, K-Line, Yang Ming, Hanjin, Evergreen 
G6                   Alliance consists of six carriers namely NYK, Hapag, OOCL, APL, 
HYMM, MOL  
O3   Alliance consists of three carriers namely CMA, CSG, UASC 
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Appendix VI Ranking of top 20 container liner carriers 
Source: Alphaliner 2015  
 
 Rank Operator TEU Ships % Share 
1 APM-Maersk 2,959,743 609 16.0% 
2 Mediterranean Shg Co 2,546,719 499 13.8% 
3 CMA CGM Group 1,713,852 457 9.3% 
4 Evergreen Line 963,214 202 5.2% 
5 Hapag-Lloyd 956,883 181 5.2% 
6 COSCO Container L. 826,470 164 4.5% 
7 CSCL 715,733 142 3.9% 
8 Hanjin Shipping 626,533 101 3.4% 
9 MOL 603,966 111 3.3% 
10 Hamburg Süd Group 576,073 121 3.1% 
11 OOCL 546,405 102 3.0% 
12 APL 546,100 89 3.0% 
13 NYK Line 498,808 106 2.7% 
14 Yang Ming Marine Transport 
Corp. 
463,329 96 2.5% 
15 UASC 410,104 56 2.2% 
16 K Line 398,963 77 2.2% 
17 Hyundai M.M. 377,060 57 2.0% 
18 PIL (Pacific Int. Line) 358,082 153 1.9% 
19 Zim 325,439 75 1.8% 
20 Wan Hai Lines 202,067 87 1.1% 
 
